U.S. Naval War College

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
CIWAG Case Studies
12-2012

Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance
Roy Godson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies

Recommended Citation
Godson, Roy, "Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 9.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/9

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

AR
UL
G

WARFARE

an
d

CE

D GROU
ME
PS

AR

R on IR
NTE
RE

Draft as of 121916

U
N

IT
ED

OL
STA
TES NA AL WAR C
V

Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance
Dr. Roy Godson

United States Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

LE

GE

Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance
Roy Godson

GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE
Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG)
US Naval War College, Newport, RI
CIWAG@usnwc.edu

This work is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This case study is available on CIWAG’s public website located at
http://www.usnwc.edu/ciwag

2

GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE

Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics,
case studies, research papers, articles, and books.
Dr. Roy Godson, the author of this case study, is president of the
National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C. He is also
Emeritus Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Godson
has authored, coauthored, or edited more than 30 books and monographs,
as well as numerous articles on issues related to national security,
intelligence, and international relations. His case study provides a
methodology for creating and maintaining intelligence dominance
consistent with rule-of-law principles.
It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First,
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War
College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct
any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the
content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all
CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety
of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as
ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The
point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the
challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real
people faced in high-pressure situations.
3
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Compiled by the case study author and by CIWAG researchers at
the Naval War College, the bibliography is a selection of the best books
and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful, and
look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for
how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed
Group’s mission here at the Naval War College.
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Author Biography
Dr. Roy Godson was elected president of the National Information Center
in 1993. He is also Professor Emeritus of Government at Georgetown
University. Dr. Godson has developed and managed educational and
training programs on several continents, consulting extensively with
governments, private sector organizations, and the United Nations’ Office
on Drug and Crime. He has also been working with educational officials,
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Caucuses, and the Middle East on the development of educational
programs to prevent political violence, crime, and corruption by building
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Acronyms and Terms
CI – counterintelligence
CONOPS – concept of operations
HN – host nation’s security and intelligence services
HUMIT – human intelligence
IRA – Irish Republican Army
MMP – model mentoring program
OPSEC – operational security
SIGINT – signals intelligence
TCG – tasking and coordination group
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I. Introduction: The Global Security Environment
In recent decades, globalization has produced both positive trends,
such as economic development, enhanced communications, and the
dissemination of liberal values, and negative ones, including the
globalization of crime, corruption, and terrorism, as well as the
uncertainties inherent in a globalized economy, including instability and
social unrest.1 To effectively manage the contemporary security
environment, the United States must be able to export local intelligence
capabilities to foreign partners. A model of key elements of these
capabilities has been developed that can be adapted relatively quickly for
use by the U.S. in other countries. It is referred to as “intelligence
dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles.”
Overall, the global security environment is characterized by
several factors that are likely to persist for more than a decade. The first is
the plethora of weak, fragile, failing, and failed states. More than half the
world’s population lives in regions where governments are unable to
control their territory. In 1945, there were approximately 50 relatively
homogeneous nation-states. By the end of the 1990s, after decolonization
and the demise of the Soviet Union, this number had grown to more than
190 heterogeneous states and now reaches approximately 200. Most of
these newer, fragile states lack the police, administrative, and economic
resources needed to govern effectively, and many cannot provide basic
goods and services to significant sectors of their population. Their
authority is challenged both within and outside their limited areas of
territorial control. Conditions in these states often include border conflicts,
diasporas, and other situations that have ramifications for their neighbors
or the entire region.
The vacuum inside these states is being filled by armed groups and
political movements that are growing in both numbers and capability.
1

For an empirical analysis of the contemporary global security environment, see Roy
Godson and Richard Shultz, Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security
Agenda, Chapters 1-3 and Appendices 1 and 2.
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They include terrorist, insurgent, militia, and criminal organizations that,
in the main, use irregular methods of violence and strategic
communication. These actors contest locally, regionally, and even globally
for power, influence, and financial reward. The global competition for
power, influence, and legitimacy that pits liberal and democratic
government elements against authoritarian rulers, elites, warlords,
opportunistic populists, tribal, ethnic, and extreme religious leaders leads
to struggles for control of populations, territory, and resources.
Related to this are criminal economies based on trafficking in
people, drugs, arms, or goods, counterfeiting of goods and services, and
smuggling and kidnapping. These have become the major source of funds
for multiple ethnic, religious, and insurgent groups in many parts of the
world and comingle war, crime, and terrorism.
Military technological transformation has provided advanced
Western countries such as the United States and Israel with unsurpassed
conventional military technologies and capabilities—but not necessarily
the winning edge in contemporary irregular conflicts. Furthermore, the
rise of enhanced information gathering and communication techniques has
been offset by a declining capability to identify and deal with violent small
groups and individuals. These are able to hide in a globalized environment
and use irregular tactics that are often impervious to conventional
information capabilities.
Given the above security challenges, it can be expected that the
United States will continue to seek to ensure that:
1.
Adversarial states and nonstate actors do not gain influence
or the political, military, economic, or cultural capabilities to
threaten vital interests. These include key U.S. allies in Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia, as well as important trading routes such as
the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Panama Canal.
2.
Hostile and adversarial coalitions of states and nonstate
actors do not become dominant or develop significant capabilities
9
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in areas vital to quality of life, particularly in U.S.-adjacent
territory (Mexico and the circum-Caribbean).
3.
Liberal and fragile democratic governments at the national,
provincial, and municipal levels receive effective assistance, as do
certain nonstate groups and movements, particularly those facing
adversarial ideological, corrupt, and criminal opponents.
To accomplish these objectives, the United States first will require
knowledge about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both adversarial
and friendly foreign governments. The U.S. also will need detailed
knowledge of the capabilities of foreign governments to maintain their
own security in the face of internal and external threats, and will need to
identify opportunities to secure the support of these governments for
regional and global coalitions to enhance security.
A further crucial requirement is acquiring knowledge of significant
foreign nonstate actors—particularly those that are or have been mobilized
by adversarial coalitions or are potential new partners for such coalitions.
Among the highest priorities will be foreign armed groups and
sympathetic political/religious movements currently in existence or being
formed. Groups and movements with an interest in the acquisition, sale, or
use of WMDs or other massive disruptive capabilities will be among the
groups of most concern. Al Qaeda, for instance, has been implicated in
attempting to acquire WMDs and could potentially use them in the United
States and the U.K.2 However, other local, regional, and aspiring global
movements have capabilities to threaten their own governments as well as
key neighbors and more distant governments and movements. Nigeria’s
Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram is rumored to be allied with Al
Qaeda and has gained influence over nearly half of the country.3 Similarly,
Al Shabaab is in control of large sections of southern Somalia and is
2

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277614,00.html;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/14/alqaida.politics
3
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nigeria-under-siege20120407,0,647319.story
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launching successful operations in neighboring countries with the hopes of
installing a larger overall caliphate ruled by Sharia law. It officially joined
Al Qaeda in February 2012.4 In the 21st century, where micro actors can
inflict macro damage at the local, regional, and even global levels, those
having such a capability will be a major concern.
Understanding and monitoring the full spectrum of such groups is
the precondition for identifying methods of neutralizing the hostile and
assisting the friendly. However, the U.S. is not in a position to monitor
half the world’s population living in 100 fragile states, most with multiple
armed groups. It can monitor some weak governments, more or less, but it
does not have and is unlikely to develop the ground personnel with the
requisite linguistic and cultural skill sets to provide and maintain coverage
in 50 or more states. Hence, it will need to build partners and networks to
help manage this challenge.
This case study is intended for those concerned with developing
U.S. knowledge of intelligence dominance and exporting its basic
elements to foreign partners. It covers the need for this capability and the
model’s key elements. It also discusses how these can be passed on to
foreign partners, so that intelligence dominance consistent with rule-oflaw principles can become a tool they can adapt to their national,
provincial, and local needs. It will discuss key assumptions about U.S.
policy requirements in the environment and identify main elements,
including a discussion of the types of intelligence products to be
developed, the major techniques and processes used to acquire these
products, and the organization and management of these capabilities.

Discussion Questions
1.
How are contemporary global security environments
shaped by the emergence of new, violent nonstate actors?
4

http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html ; http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0209/africa/world_africa_somalia-shabaab-qaeda_1_al-zawahiri-qaeda-somaliamericans?_s=PM:AFRICA
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2.
In what global security environments do violent nonstate
actors flourish, and why?
3.
Is intelligence preparation of the operational environment
essential before committing forces? Explain.
4.
Why must the U.S. insist that the exportable model of
intelligence dominance be consistent with rule-of-law and integrity
principles?
5.
How does “mapping” a group’s infrastructure and other
details aid in operations? Is this mapping more useful for one facet
of operations than another? Explain.

A. The Problem
U.S. intelligence has many effective capabilities, particularly the
use of technology to collect information on foreign governments and their
military forces and to find and fix hostile nonstate leaders. Effective “fullservice” intelligence results from the interplay of four elements with
overall security policy: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert
action. They are correlated with policy and the operations of other
instruments of statecraft.
Collection entails the capture of information, either by informants
(human intelligence, or HUMINT) or via electronic eavesdropping
(signals intelligence, or SIGINT). In addition to strategic direction
identifying major priorities, the collectors need analysts to guide them, to
make sense of the “take,” and then to redirect them as gaps are identified.
Analysts need collectors to learn bits and pieces of what is happening on
the ground. They then collate the most important information and compile
it into reports for policy makers. Both collectors and analysts need the
protection of security and counterintelligence to intellectually vet
collection from penetration and deliberate deception and fabrication: in
2010, a Russian spy ring in New York was exposed after allegedly

12
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attempting to gain access to influential Americans.5 Covert action, which
can shape and mitigate threats, benefits from all of the above and can
contribute to collection and analysis. Intelligence contributes not only to
policy making but also to kinetic and nonkinetic operations and vice versa.
Military and diplomatic operations, if calibrated to do so, can contribute in
significant ways to collection and analysis as well as the other elements of
intelligence.6
The more this full-service symbiosis is recognized, managed, and
institutionalized, the better the results. Relying on one or more elements
without this “symbiotic calibration” reduces the strategic advantage that
effective intelligence confers. The U.S. itself will benefit from developing
and deploying these skills. It will also benefit from being able to mentor
foreign security services in the skills necessary for full-service capabilities
in diverse geopolitical environments.
Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is often not
well configured to obtain detailed information about the local
environments it is fighting to control. For example, the Marine general
who commanded the First Marine Division in the taking of Fallujah, Iraq
in November 2004, told a Marine Corps oral history interviewer:
We really didn’t know what we were going to find in that city. I
mean there were no doubts in my mind about our Marines. I
knew we would be victorious. … We did find some chemical
labs. We found a lot of what were coined “torture chambers,”
slaughter houses. … I never imagined the amount of ordnance
and weapons we would find. … We found propaganda factories. I
didn’t realize how entrenched the insurgents were in the city.7
5

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10442223
For a breakdown of the importance of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and
covert action and their symbiotic relationship in the world of intelligence, see Roy
Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards? U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence
(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).
7
U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview with Maj. Gen. Richard F.
Natonski, 16 March, 2005.
6
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Although U.S. intelligence practices have improved since then and
there have been significant successes, major elements of U.S. intelligence
doctrine about the local environment have not kept pace, even in regions
where U.S. forces are heavily committed.8 The same is true in regions
vital to U.S. interests where governments are challenged by local
adversarial armed groups.

B. The Solution
The United States can substantially increase the coverage of this
population, particularly local armed groups, by encouraging and securing
the cooperation of the local security and intelligence services (hereafter
referred to as host nations, or HN). It then can train them to develop the
requisite skill sets to complement U.S. capabilities, particularly the
technological and sophisticated capabilities that most weak states would
not otherwise have for many years to come.
What is needed to accomplish this is a relatively simple, low-tech,
exportable intelligence model that would be appealing to governments of
areas of particular interest to the United States. This model would not
utilize U.S. techniques or methods that are proprietary or classified, many
of which are expensive and technologically sophisticated. The U.S. must,
however, insist that the exportable model be consistent with rule-of-law
and integrity principles.
In recent decades, the U.S. and other democracies have established
bodies of law, guidelines, and oversight mechanisms to help ensure that
their own intelligence practitioners are guided in the performance of their
professional duties by rule-of-law principles. These laws and guidelines
never operate perfectly. And it cannot be expected that relatively new and
fragile democracies confronted with threats to their existence will be able
8

See for example, Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D.
Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,”
Center for New American Security, January 4, 2010. Gen. Flynn was Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan. http://www.cnas.org/node/3924
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to match these standards in the short term. However, it is possible to insist
on the inclusion of human rights, rule-of-law principles, and integrity/anticorruption education in U.S. foreign assistance programs for foreign
police, security, and intelligence personnel.
Such an intelligence model has been developed and tested. It has
been and continues to be used in the U.K. and other democracies. The U.S.
has tested the model, working first with Iraqi police in Anbar and later
with the Iraqi Army in other provinces; it is now also in use in parts of
Afghanistan. The essence of the model is developing the local knowledge
to enable military and/or police operational forces to degrade, disrupt, and
neutralize armed group challenges to governmental authority within the
confines of the rule of law.
The key characteristic of the model that differentiates it from
other models of foreign intelligence in democratic societies is the
development of systematic local knowledge. This model builds from
the ground up. The local level feeds the regional or national center to aid
in strategic decision making while also facilitating local tactical decision
making.
The focus of the products, process, and organization of this
approach is not on the centers of other governments’ power—i.e., the
state, its central command and control, its strategic culture, its capabilities.
The focus of this model is on the local people, the street, and the land:
the local level. This is “intelligence among the people,” consistent with
rule-of-law principles. One example is the U.S. Army Human Intelligence
Teams in Afghanistan: among other tasks, members collect
anthropological interviews to gather information on individuals at the
local level in order to better understand relationships of all players in a
specific area.9
9

For further reading on Human Terrain Teams, see Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl
Prinslow, and Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21 st Century,”
Military Review, September-October 2006,
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2.ht
ml, accessed April 9, 2012

15

GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE

The products are detailed knowledge—mapping—of aboveground preferences, proclivities, political movements, and power
brokers, as well as specific detailed mapping of the underground
(illegal) structures of such movements in the region. These “maps”
enable the police, military, and other elements of law enforcement to
identify and target10 criminals with precision and within the confines of
the law, even if there is little or no violence at any given time. This
precision enables intelligence to focus on armed groups while interfering
with the local population as little as possible, which is vitally important if
community support for the security forces is to be maintained.
Above-ground armed group leaders and operatives present a
special problem. Some individuals will be identified as belonging to an
organization that has legal and/or even “charitable” purposes. As
individuals, they may not be committing violent criminal acts themselves;
that is, they are not physically assisting or conspiring to assist the
underground or acting in a violent manner. Some, however, are “dualhatted.” They have two lives or careers—one above and one below
ground. It is the second career that makes them subject to targeting, such
as the medical doctor or religious figure who is also a Mafia or terrorist
leader.
Based on intelligence, leaders and active participants in the
underground are to be targeted, recruited, or, if possible, arrested. This is
not only humane and consistent with the rule of law but also, when
skillfully handled by intelligence and the democratic polity, more
productive. If their violent resistance or whereabouts makes arrest
impossible or costly in terms of human life, then other specific procedures
(and rules of engagement) are required.

10

Identify here means finding evidence or proof that indicates that a specific person is
violating criminal law and therefore can be targeted by police, military, or intelligence
operations; target means operations to arrest or detain identified persons, as well as their
conviction and imprisonment, unless the person is willing to cooperate under rule-of-law
procedures.
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C. Maps
The underground or “infrastructure” of a mature group, such as
Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), is usually organized into
a cell structure or a military structure. In addition to its command and
control unit (executive committee), the infrastructure includes the
following:

a financial subgroup that acquires and administers the
group’s funds, usually by illegal means. The IRA used funding
from Catholic sympathizers in the United States and elsewhere, as
well as alleged funding from Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi, the
Palestine Liberation Organization, and Basque separatists; it also
collected funds through such criminal measures as kidnapping and
extortion;

a “military” wing that trains for and uses assorted forms of
irregular violence. The IRA’s “Green Book” provided trainees
with instruction in—among other topics— military operations,
propaganda techniques, and resistance techniques for interrogation;

a security component that “protects” the organization from
penetration by adversaries, whether government forces, ideological
dissenters, or other armed groups. The IRA relied on a group of
specialists to identify informants and British penetration of its
organization and promoted clandestine tradecraft among IRA
operatives;

an intelligence wing that guides the underground and its
operations, e.g., the names and lifestyles of potential targets;

a supply wing, the “quartermaster,” that secures tools of the
trade such as weapons, supplies, documents, methods of
communication. The IRA made its own weapons and had a group
of engineers working for them;

a propaganda and strategic communication wing that
develops narratives and communicates them both through
17
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underground and the above-ground network of journalists and
sympathetic politicians and community leaders. Sinn Fein was the
political wing of the IRA and served as its mouthpiece; and

a recruitment subgroup with the capability to spot, assess,
and train new recruits.
These must be mapped by HN intelligence so that strategy and operations
can be formulated and conducted with maximum effect.
Maps of the active population also provide evidence of incipient
armed groups. Are there groups with criminal or extremist ideologies in
formation? How serious or potentially serious are they? What can be done
legally—consistent with the rule of law—to distract, persuade, or channel
these groups into more constructive directions before they mature and
become major problems?
These maps also identify which other local groups, political
movements, leaders, and networks may be helpful in separating the people
from the adversarial armed group. This is crucial. The U.S. and friendly
fragile governments cannot be expected to “immunize” the entire
population from the blandishments and threats of mature adversarial
armed groups on their own. They need local allies, preferably those who
carry local moral and legal authority and who have a capacity to compete
with the attractions, narratives, skills, and capabilities of adversarial armed
groups. It is essential to understand the motivations of potentially
supportive local actors and what they can be expected to achieve, as seen
in Afghanistan’s Anbar Awakening in 2006-2007, when local sheiks
pledged to assist U.S. forces against the insurgency on the basis of mutual
security interests. Only by obtaining and retaining local knowledge can
decisions be made about the extent and continuity of support to them.
In sum, this intelligence provides the capability to dominate the
local battle space. It provides preventive intelligence before an armed
group becomes powerful enough to conduct multiple violent operations. If
it is well developed and truly dominant over the security and intelligence
of the armed group, it can even provide intelligence during ongoing enemy
18
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operations. It also provides intelligence after the attacks—who conducted
them and why. Intelligence dominance provides the basis for neutralizing
and degrading adversarial groups.

19

GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE

II. Principal Elements of an Exportable Model
The next three sections are focused on the elements of the
exportable model. We first discuss the principal elements of the local
units; the role of the regional/provincial units and integration at the
national level follows.

Discussion Questions
1.
Which type of local-level intelligence collection is
relatively easy to obtain?
2.
What benefits do police forces bring to the table at the local
level of intelligence collection?
3.
What critical human elements must exist between police
forces and the local intelligence unit for this model to be effective?
4.
Deconfliction is an important aspect of regional-level
tasking and coordination. What other functions are specific to this
level of operational intelligence?
5.
Regional commanders often have to make difficult timely
decisions without the benefit of explicitly clear intelligence. What
personnel other than those described below would you use to arrive
at your decision, and why?
6.
What is the role of intelligence control strategy at the
national level?

A. The Local Level
The local level is key. It is the only place to obtain systematic,
detailed knowledge of the people and their friendly and adversarial groups
and movements. This can be supported by national-level collection
systems and analysis, but only the local level can provide systematic
crucial information.
20
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The first step to a locally oriented intelligence capability is to
divide a region or key municipalities into specific geographic sections,
essentially a grid. Then a small intelligence unit is established for each or
most grid sections. (See Figure 2.)
This unit does three types of intelligence collection: basic,
infrastructure, and target. (See Figure 1.)
1.
Basic intelligence identifies important existing features of a
particular geographic section. This includes specific human terrain
mapping—key activists, leaders and influential people,
communications, modes, financial, and political social networks;
existing armed groups and subgroups, and groups in an embryonic
stage of development. It is block-by-block, village-by-village
knowledge. For this coverage, collectors initially establish
networks of people in each of these areas. These consist of diverse
human sources, not just controlled confidential agents or high-level
controlled informants. These sources are usually relatively easy to
obtain through the local police or military—whoever is out there
every day. Perhaps as much as 40 percent of the
personnel/resources assigned to each local unit are assigned to
basic intelligence.
2.
Infrastructure intelligence, by contrast, focuses on the
“order of battle” of armed groups: their membership, activities, and
intentions. It also consists of data on the political beliefs and
dogmas of group leaders; group operational doctrine and strategy;
organizational structure; and linkages with states and other groups.
Approximately 90 percent of this information is from confidential
sources recruited and managed by “hybrid” case officers (see
below) with intimate knowledge of the local culture and language
in which the groups operate. Tactical local signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and imagery from various sensors (e.g., aerial
surveillance) collected locally supports case officers’ human
collection. Other important methods, such as local interrogation,
21
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also yield information about local groups.11 Case officers are
supported by a local analyst who identifies collection gaps, is
familiar with all source knowledge, and helps identify specific
targets to exploit. Another supporting analytical task is the near
real-time exploitation of captured documents, computers, and so
forth, either taken in the geographic setting or in another section of
the local grid.
3.
The third type of collection is local target intelligence. This
pinpoints the activities and movements of adversarial group leaders
and personnel, information that can be speedily exploited. The
information is derived from all sources: local, regional, and
national systems and local agents, SIGINT, imagery, and
interrogation. It can provide continual live coverage of the
selective targets and is derived from and augmented by basic and
infrastructure intelligence.
Personnel and Structure
The local unit will be comprised of several types of people or skill
sets (see Figure II, B), including hybrid case officers. This term refers to
professionals who are familiar with both law enforcement intelligence
techniques and the traditional clandestine techniques usually associated
with foreign intelligence in hostile environments. These case officers are
expected to identify, assess, recruit, and manage confidential sources in a
position to provide access to the above- and below-ground leaders and
operations of the armed groups in their sector.
The case officers receive specific requirements from the unit’s
chief, who receives requirements from the regional and national levels.
The unit chief and his team then turn these requirements into specific
questions and decide how best to acquire the required information—what
could be obtained from local SIGINT or imagery, for example, and what
“Interrogation” means official detention and questioning of suspects in the grid sector
by a trained specialist, quickly, and in cooperation with local case officers and a local
analyst before a suspect is sent for processing and trial.
11
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must be obtained from recruited human sources or detainees, and over
what period of time. Local unit personnel meet almost daily and are
responsible for reporting their specific methods and sources as well as
their view of the reliability of their sources to the local unit chief, who
reports to the regional or provincial level.
For example, a local unit might task recruited informants about the
personnel in the local armed group they know or have access to. Who are
the leaders, and what are their strengths and weaknesses? What are the
important political and other differences that affect their cooperation and
interaction? Who specifically makes up the cell’s rank and file? What
skills do they possess, and how committed are they to the group and its
cause? What are the cell’s physical capabilities—houses, weapons caches,
bomb-making facilities? What are the sources and details of finance—
kidnapping, extortion, smuggling goods, gasoline, drugs, foreign
contributions? Who is responsible for securing community support or
passivity? Who writes or makes videos, and how are they distributed?
Who in the group is responsible for providing financial contributions or
goods for the community? Who in the group resolves disputes or imposes
“justice” in the community?
The local case officer would be familiar with local culture and
would operate under official or “thin” cover. One of the most successful
models of developing this capability has been built upon using the
intelligence and/or special branch of the police. The British in particular
have repeatedly used this approach, and more recently the United States
has found it effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why the police? First, the
police have stations in each grid section. They are very well placed to
gather most of the basic intelligence as well as a great deal of
infrastructure and target intelligence on a regular basis. They have a
relatively secure place to operate from and to store basic equipment, such
as computers, desks, files, and safes. Second, they are to some extent
physically protected from armed attack by the regular, uniformed police at
the station, as opposed to operating from safe houses.
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Third, police officers on the beat usually have unparalleled access
to the community on a continual basis. Patrolling daily, particularly in
urban areas, they are among the few officials who know who is who and
who is a stranger, and can identify anomalies or unusual happenings on
the street and in the community, such as new or odd people, cars, money,
shops, and so on. They can also be tasked to provide simple elements of
basic intelligence—who associates with whom, what the local power
relationships and above-ground affiliations and activities are, the presence
of specific license plates. When effectively tasked and when the
information is organized, these products can be used to verify and amplify
information from recruited confidential sources.
In addition, the local police are tasked to follow lawful procedures.
They may not always do so, but they operate within a legal framework.
Further, they are in a position to grant or withhold “favors”—to help those
who help them by, for example, assisting with local bureaucrats, obtaining
construction or building permits, or withholding such favors. This is not a
“corrupt” relationship. It is normal human interaction to be especially
helpful to those who are helpful. And these eyes and ears on the streets
have proven to be very useful on a daily basis.
If for one reason or another it is not feasible or desirable to use the
police for this function (e.g., if the local population or the local police are
hostile to the intelligence unit), the case officers and their colleagues will
need to seek out other physical accommodations such as a walled-off
compound in a military facility. This has the advantage of being a
relatively secure facility for personnel, equipment, interrogation, and
collection of intelligence. It may lead to closer cooperation with local
military commanders and their operational units. But its disadvantage is
that it is further removed from the people and basic sources of knowledge.
In practice, both types of “forward operating bases” have been successful.
When the local unit is up and functioning and much of the
composition of the adversarial armed group has been identified and can be
separated from the friendly or passive population, the unit will be in a
position to provide the local military or police special forces with target
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intelligence necessary to neutralize the local group’s activities with
precision. This may include capturing or shutting down safe houses and
bomb factories, seizing weapons, financial or other logistical capabilities,
and accessing computers, reports, and documents that would identify
adversarial penetration or recruitment of local police, military, or
intelligence operatives in the local area, or in nearby areas.
To be effective, the local intelligence unit must have an almost
seamless relationship (see Figure 2C) with local military and/or police
forces. The military and police must be willing to trust the local
intelligence unit and the information and warnings they provide. Military
operators in turn can be of considerable assistance to the local intelligence
units, either by assisting in their daily collection, such as tasking their
daily checkpoints and patrols to report on specific anomalies, or by
intentionally not interfering with the local unit’s collection, for example,
not having patrols or checkpoints in a specific area where meetings with
informants are scheduled on a given day.
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Figure 1. Collection Products
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B. The Regional Level: Regional Tasking and
Coordination Groups
The next step up the organizational and production ladder is the
regional unit. This may be a citywide entity, made up of local units in a
given city, or a provincial or statewide entity. Sometimes, only one or
more cities or provinces may be interested in having the capability. In that
case, the organizational and production ladder goes no further. Although
there may be intelligence in a given region or city, there would be no
national dominance system.
There are several ways to use, organize, and execute the regional
function. Diverse countries have developed diverse arrangements. No
matter the arrangement, there has to be a decision on who and which part
of the security establishment is in charge at both the regional and the
national levels—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior’s
security service, or the national or regional police. Arrangements will also
have to be made with the prosecutor’s office, relevant oversight judges,
and the prison system. For the system to be most efficient, all will
cooperate. There must be a clear-cut chain of command, from the local to
the regional to the national command, and then to the elected political
leadership.
Frustration will be minimized and efficiency maximized when all
relevant leaders up and down the chain of command understand what the
system is designed to achieve and how their agency fits into the picture, at
all levels. A common “language” or culture must exist to further
maximum cooperation among the relevant players, operators,
commanders, judges, and politicians. Whichever ministry or agency is in
charge, the unction of the central command unit, also called the tasking
and coordination group, is to task, coordinate, provide services to, and
“protect” local units.
Responsibilities and Desks
The regional process begins with collating the collection products
of the local units to disseminate to other regions and to the national level,
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and back down to its local units. First, the region transmits and monitors
national collection priorities to the local unit commanders, who collect to
the specifications of national needs, translated into local requirements. The
second function of the region is to coordinate and sometimes adjudicate
the collection conducted by the local units, as well as the particular
requests of national intelligence agencies with a specific interest in
personnel or activities in the region. It is responsible for managing,
coordinating, and deconflicting local units in its region and coordinates the
work of the local units to ensure cooperation between local units.
Infrastructure activities and likely target personnel cross
geographic grids, often operating across borders. Collection thus must be
coordinated between local grid sectors. For example, as hostile armed
groups physically move across the boundaries of two or more local units,
there needs to be coordination as to who is responsible for what among the
local units. Which local unit will be targeting which individual as he
moves from the territory of one unit to another? If one local unit is
recruiting a person who lives in their city, what happens if another unit
identifies the same person as working in their zone and wants to recruit the
target? The regional TCG is responsible for knowing about and deciding
which local unit is to take responsibility for recruiting and running the
target—the unit in the home city, or the unit in the workplace. Alternately,
are two units meeting their agents in the same vicinity on any given night?
To avoid having too much local presence (too many strange cars in the
proposed meeting area), the TCG will recommend alternatives such as
changing the meeting of one unit to another night. This is known as
deconfliction.
Specialist support can also be available at the regional level from
national Special Forces, surveillance units, imagery, and other sources not
always available locally. Covert exploitation, via tasking the appropriate
agency, and coordination can also be controlled from the region. This is
part of the normal management chain, with regional managers overseeing
local managers. Collection also often needs to be coordinated with other
regions, as well as with national intelligence services that have the reach
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to collect and exploit infrastructure and target intelligence about armed
groups operating abroad. This regional coordination function would be
undertaken by a small staff of regional managers and operators and would
include representatives from operational agencies whose assistance is
often important to effective collection and exploitation.
A third regional function is the collation and analysis of the
collection take of the local units in the region. This is run by regional
“desks,” staffed mostly by analysts. These products include sanitized
agent reports, the judgments of the local unit, or assessments and answers
to collection tasks assigned by the national level. They may be sent
horizontally to other regions and vertically up and down to the national
level and the region’s local units.
The desks producing these analytical products can be organized in
diverse ways. They may be functionally or theme-oriented (e.g.,
concerned with the finances of particular armed groups in the region), or
group-focused (e.g., concerned with the overall strengths, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities of specific groups). They are responsible for compiling a
knowledge base of the key groups, associated factions, rivals, personalities
and structures, or specialized subjects such as group finances. On a weekly
basis the desks would prepare overview reports, including metrics. They
will also able to note gaps in coverage, anomalies in local reporting, and
how regional knowledge reinforces or conflicts with reporting from other
regions or the national level.
A desk can be created or disbanded to meet the current national
requirement and the particular circumstances in each region. Each desk,
however, would be run by one or two supervisory staff, with one or more
analysts and support staff, who are subject matter specialists. Together
with the desk’s files and databases, they will become the institutional
memory of the region.
A fourth function of the regional office is providing enhanced
security and counterintelligence (CI) for both the operations of the local
units and the products of the analytical desks. Full-service intelligence
involves both CI and security production for collection and analysis, as
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well as the option of using knowledge of adversary intelligence for
“offensive” purposes, that is, to neutralize and disrupt the adversary’s
intelligence and security operations.
A small CI regional desk with both analytical and operational
capabilities would be necessary. It will provide assistance with vetting
local sources (through databases and other reporting) and also review the
validity of the operations and reports emanating from interaction with
these sources. The CI desk would also have the operational capability to
investigate security breakdowns or anomalies, whether spotted by the
analytical desks in the region or by other regions, national sources or
capabilities, or the concerns raised by a local unit. The local units can and
should be responsible for the security of their own operations (OPSEC).
But they cannot be expected, on their own, to conduct secure and
sometimes sensitive investigations of their sources or staff. A dedicated CI
group, including a surveillance and investigative capability, reporting to
the senior regional commander, is required.
The regional CI desks would also be responsible for implementing
nationally tasked offensive operations through their coordination of the
local level. The region may also come up with offensive ideas and
programs that have to be approved and coordinated with the other regions
through the national-level CI coordination function.
The regional levels probably also need to have an informanthandling unit apart from the capabilities of the local units. This is because
a local-level informant may be living and working in a grid section where
meetings with case officers may be too risky, particularly in small
communities, or the source is deemed so important that special handling is
required to protect and take full advantage of the source. In these
situations, the regional office would be able to handle the source and his or
her information more effectively than the local unit. This regional unit can
also assist local units who need to meet local sources outside their local
jurisdictions.
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The Central Command Unit
The heart and soul of the regional organization is its central
command unit, which the British some years ago dubbed the tasking and
coordination group (TCG) (see Figure 2, Regional TCG). This function
exists at the regional level. There is also a national-level TCG (described
later) that controls the regional TCGs. The national level sets the regional
intelligence requirements and receives the take. It also provides policy
guidelines and budgetary parameters for the regional level and oversees
regional intelligence production, operation, and compliance with the
guidelines, resource allocation, and budget.
However, it is the regional-level TCG that applies and oversees the
local unit’s production and implementation. The regional TCG supports
the national TCG. It is the intermediary between national policy making
and local knowledge acquisition and its regional exploitation. How rapidly
and effectively the regional TCG works is a second key to overall
intelligence effectiveness. There needs to be a capability to focus all
relevant government resources and all local and regional resources on key
targets. Usually, this is not easy; intelligence is rarely clear-cut. There will
be clues and pieces of information and divergent views on the significance
and validity of this information among both intelligence and operational
units. Time is usually of the essence. The key task of the regional
commander therefore is to screen out “noise” and integrate the diverse
views of local units and other agencies into coherent, surgical exploitation.
Commanders must be sensitive, flexible, and open to diverse inputs, but at
the same time they are required to be clear and decisive, so their decisions
are understood in their own and in partner agencies.
Indeed, one of the key differences between 20th-century statecentric warfare and 21st-century “irregular” war is the importance of the
acquisition of granular local knowledge and its rapid exploitation, so that
armed groups and coalitions (or groups and their state partners) can be
neutralized through a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic operations.
Preparing and deploying skilled TCG team managers, analysts, and
operators at the regional level is vital.
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This group should include a regional commander who is
responsible for supervising and coordinating local operations through (a)
his Operations commander, who is in frequent contact with local unit
commanders and the region’s police, military, and other government
operational forces; and (b) his Intelligence Unit commander, responsible
for all the region’s intelligence desks, and particularly for the acquisition
and dissemination of all actionable intelligence to partner governmental
organizations in the region on a 24/7 basis. This regional command will
also usually need a small special support desk to identify, on a 24/7 basis,
information or operations that could further be exploited through TCGcontrolled functions or those of partner agencies, to make a reality of the
slogan “intelligence is operations.”
Sample Weekly Schedule
Effective regional commanders would follow a notional weekly
schedule approximating the one shown in Table 1.
The remainder of the week would be devoted to regional and local
coordination, deconfliction, exploitation, and preparation for the following
week’s cycle. Needless to say, there would also be daily contact between
the regions and the national TCG staff, and as required, the national-level
TCG commanders.
Other important matters such as human resource issues,
management, business, and equipment issues at the local and regional
levels would not be subjects discussed through the distinctive TCG
channels. The regional TCG would be focused only on tasking,
coordination, and production and exploitation.
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Monday:

PM:

Operations and analysis submanagers review current
priorities, threats, and operations to anticipate weekly tasking
to regional desks and local units; and resources coordination
required for and from regional partner agencies.
Written report prepared for regional commander.

Tuesday
AM:

Regional commander’s decision on weekly priority threats
and required resources, coordination.
Region’s written proposals forwarded to national TCG staff
to prepare agenda for national and regional TCG weekly
meeting.

PM:

National and regional TCG commanders meet via electronic
means (phone, video teleconferencing, e-mail) to review
current national priorities, new information, urgent tasking and
coordination, any necessary resource reconfiguration and
deconfliction necessary.
Tasking and coordination decision relayed to regional subcommanders, local units, and cooperating partners, i.e., what,
if anything, has changed in response to national priorities, new
information and analysis, and resource allocation.

Table 1. Sample TCG Schedule

C. The National Level: National Tasking and
Coordination Group
The national (or strategic) TCG develops and reviews the national
strategic assessment and an intelligence control strategy to ensure that the
national intelligence system and regional operations are coordinated. It
also advises on the use of intelligence in achieving national policy
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objectives. The national TCG can provide a vehicle for informing other
national-level leaders on regional events and issues that may have national
and international significance. It also provides a focal point for
accountability to the minister in charge and has responsibility for security
screening, vetting, and operational security for its own or headquarters
personnel.
Responsibilities
The national strategic assessment identifies the threats and
challenges that armed groups are likely to present over the medium to long
term (one year and longer), as well as resulting intelligence, current issues,
and those likely to emerge. Threat assessments, produced on a biannual
basis, need to be reviewed every three months to ensure that they are
current. The assessment would focus on what is currently known about the
groups (their maturation, strategy, capabilities, and tactics) and key gaps
in knowledge that need to be filled.
A second function of this TCG is to develop collection and
analytical priorities, sometimes called the intelligence control strategy.
This document sets the agenda for regional intelligence collection,
analysis, and exploitation. Based on a critical examination of the findings
of the strategic assessment, it provides senior headquarters and regional
management with a framework in which decisions can be made about the
issues that should take precedence in resource allocation. It identifies
requirements, gaps to be closed, and specific regional tasking. After the
TCG reviews and sets the control strategy, it meets regularly (every three
to four months) to review and monitor progress or adjust the strategy.
The national TCG prepares and tasks regional TCGs with the
intelligence control strategy and manages its regional implementation. It
also draws together and synthesizes the analytical products of the regional
TCGs and disseminates them to national policy makers. Managers and
their staff identify gaps and operations priorities that need to be addressed
by the regions and their local units. For example, if two or more regions
are reporting outstanding results and other regions are not, the national
35

GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE

TCG staff will try to make sense of this disparity and how to reduce the
shortfalls.
It can also provide early warning and reporting to the minister in
charge about current or emerging regional and local issues of national and
international salience. This would focus on intelligence (and other
government operations based on intelligence) on topics such as raids,
trials, critical incidents, or media coverage that are likely to affect public
confidence and impact communities.
To help reinforce the rule-of-law culture within the regional and
local units, it could serve as a single point of contact for government
oversight and accountability for regional and local intelligence activities.
This would also provide a mechanism for rapid investigation of and public
response to reported violations of official intelligence doctrine.
The national TCG would also play a role in ensuring the
operational security of the TCG as a whole, and it would assist and protect
the security of intelligence-related documents passed to senior leaders in
direct contact with or negotiating with representatives of armed groups.
Staff and Structure
In many ways, the organization of the national TCG would mirror
that of the regional TCG, with submanagers and staff for both intelligence
and operations. On the intelligence analysis side, there would be themeand group-oriented desks collating materials from the regions and
incorporating products from national-level intelligence
collection/analytical systems and open sources. On the operational side,
most of the staff would be experienced practitioners who have moved up
the ranks from the local to regional levels and are familiar with the
extensive paperwork and approvals for operations required both for
effectiveness and for ensuring that the system remains consistent with the
principles of the rule of law.
National subcommanders would review the weekly reports and
requests of the regional commanders. They also would participate in the
weekly (electronic) meeting of the regions. The most senior national TCG
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commander would be responsible to the minister-in-charge. He/she would
attend relevant meetings of other intelligence services, ministries, and
foreign partners.
One of the main doctrinal decisions to be made is the extent of
fusion in the TCG, particularly at the top. There is little doubt that fusion
between the intelligence operators and analysts should take place at the
local and regional levels, particularly when the subject is targeting armed
groups and their active personnel. There the intelligence is fragile and time
is of the essence. However, in the longer-term assessment function, some
would make a case for more separation. Speed is not of the essence in
longer-term intelligence collection; detached observation and reflection is
the higher priority. The solution here may not be organizational but may
lie with the leadership of commanders who recognize this dilemma and
develop flexible methods of resolving it.
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III. Exporting the Model
This model provides a proven intelligence architecture. It enables a
rule-of-law–oriented democracy to combat hostile nonstate internal actors
by collecting and using locally derived information. Here, we discuss how
to export the model or capability. How could a democracy such as the
United States successfully assist new and fragile democracies to embed
this concept into their preexisting security and intelligence infrastructure?
Additionally, how could the U.S. assist in developing such a capability
from the ground up in concert with weak partner governments?
The answer is by developing and maintaining a comprehensive
planning and mentoring program to assist a foreign partner’s security and
intelligence structure. This will be referred to as the Model Mentoring
Program (MMP). The MMP seeks to infuse the intelligence dominance
model into part or all of the operations of a nascent or already existing
Host Nation security structure—a transformation that would result in
increasingly sophisticated and efficient intelligence-driven operations on
the part of the HN. To illustrate how the MMP could be implemented, two
environments will be considered: (1) when U.S. forces are already heavily
and operationally embedded within the allied nation; and (2) when there is
not substantial U.S. military presence in the country.

Discussion Questions
1.
What additional elements would MMP and HN planners
incorporate into a comprehensive doctrine that would take into
account the host nation’s atmospherics?
2.
Explain why doctrinal drift would present a challenge to
MMP mentors.
3.
The “doctrinal group” should include senior members of
the HN service. Why?
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4.
Why is it necessary to have a uniformed member manage
and supervise a military sponsored MMP? What about in a conflict
environment?
5.
List some of the reasons why sustained interactive
mentoring at every level of operation is fundamental for success.
6.
What methods could facilitate effective integration of the
intelligence dominance model by the MMP?
7.
How can information-sharing agreements positively affect
the mentoring program?
8.
Host nation “buy-in” for the MMP is a must for it to be
successful. How can the MMP ensure indigenous support for the
long term?
9.
What major differences are there to exporting the
intelligence dominance model for states that do not seek a
conventional U.S. military presence?
10.
Without U.S. military forces involved, who is responsible
for identifying which host nation units to partner with? What
variables must be considered when selecting these partners?

A. Exporting the Capability With a Current U.S. Military
Presence
This first environment is one in which the U.S. has a formidable
military presence that is authorized to conduct independent operations in
the HN and has identified the maturation of HN military and police forces
as a strategic goal. This scenario is directly analogous to the U.S. military
presence in Iraq prior to the signing of the conventional Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) in 2008. U.S. forces provided considerable assistance
to its security structures and were able to encourage and support reforms
with infusions of funding, supplies, and mentors. Iraq, while not
supportive of all U.S. designs, was interested in developing its own
capabilities, including U.S.-supported security reform in consultation and
with the approval of Iraqi officials. Personnel assigned to mentoring Iraq
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officers served within a relatively permissive security environment,
enjoying the protection of U.S. and Iraqi forces. They were able to
regularly interact with their partnered Iraqi element at the national,
regional, or local levels.
The existing presence of a significant U.S. military force will make
it easier to persuade the Host Nation that the United States can help it
install the intelligence dominance model in one or more regions. There
already will be a U.S. infrastructure and planning methods in place for
concluding important security agreements with the HN, and there will be
U.S. senior military leaders inside the country who have the confidence of
key ministers (e.g. defense, interior/intelligence). And although foreign
mentors will need to be recruited, important U.S. logistical,
communications, and supportive intelligence capabilities that can assist in
building the dominance capability will already be in the country. There
still will be significant obstacles to overcome to developing the MMP and
productive HN local dominance capabilities, but it has been done in parts
of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Given these circumstances, an MMP program would need to
successfully execute two central objectives:
1.
The creation or refinement of an intelligence capability that
can immediately aid U.S. and local military forces in the
prosecution of a campaign against irregular warfare adversaries;
and
2.
Preparation of an autonomous indigenous intelligence
capability that is fully integrated within the government and can
operate independently of external support upon the cessation of
large-scale U.S. military operations.
MMP managers and personnel, in conjunction with host nation
partners, would initially prepare a comprehensive doctrine and an
operational phased plan. This doctrine and plan would benefit from
successful real-world examples culled from historic and recent conflicts. It
would focus on current in-country requirements and circumstances. A
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prerequisite for the adoption of the model would be a joint feasibility
study or survey that would be used to develop a phased plan and adapt the
doctrine to the local HN environment. Once deemed acceptable by all
parties, the doctrine could then be implemented through a widespread
mentoring program involving the requisite number of experienced
mentors. These mentors, consistently guided by the plan and doctrine,
would be deployed at the local, regional, and national levels of HN
operations and would work full-time with partner personnel.
Although afforded significant advantages by a large-scale U.S.
military presence, an MMP in this scenario would need to be mindful of a
range of often unpredictable factors that can delay and endanger program
success. To mitigate risk, the MMP must follow a methodical, regular, and
transparent process of adaptation, revision of the written doctrine, and
mentoring.
Doctrine and Planning
Due to the key role played in HN force development initiatives in
the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, much attention has been paid to
the professional backgrounds and skills—or lack thereof—of individuals
charged with building the police and military forces of both nations.
Critics have suggested that neither the U.S. military nor the American
interagency process possess the requisite number of skilled personnel to
immediately and effectively build a HN security capability, forcing those
charged with overseeing the effort to be overly reliant on contractors or
other external sources.
This focus on the trainers versus an examination of the material
they are assigned to convey is limiting. Too little attention has been paid
to the quality, form, and origin of the detailed doctrine that guides
mentoring initiatives. Recognizing the pivotal role of doctrine, the Model
Mentoring Plan would seek, before the deployment of any assets, to
review the existing documents on doctrine for dominance. If this is not
suitable or needs further adaptation, it will be necessary to author and
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finalize a comprehensive description of the model, the phases of the plan,
and how, precisely, they would be realized in-country.
MMP doctrine would be formulated specifically to pass on to the
HN security service the procedures, processes, and methods necessary to
maintain an intelligence-driven campaign for local intelligence
dominance. Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is not
usually configured to obtain detailed information about the local
environments it is fighting to control.12 The doctrine thus would offer
detailed guidance on the full spate of organized intelligence activity, from
management and tasking to operations. Concerning procedures, MMP
doctrine would include advisories on the proper structure of HN offices at
the local, regional, and national levels, including recommended staffing
levels, requisite skill sets, and expected resource allocations—of money,
vehicles, work space—at all levels of operations.
The doctrine would also include the description of specific
operational methods, including the recruitment and management of
sources, the conduct of surveillance, the protection of sources, and
analytical tradecraft, operations security, and so forth. At every level of
description, the doctrine would convey how each specific institution,
procedure, or method integrates within the overall model-based construct.
The possession of this core doctrine is particularly important with
regard to the instruction of a security/intelligence element. Given their
inherently complex and sophisticated nature, intelligence methods and
procedures require precise and regular explanation. Misunderstandings,
referencing of individual experiences, or unsupervised deviations on the
part of mentors could quickly lead to uneven implementation and the
facilitation of competing partial models within the HN service. To avoid
this, mentors and foreign students alike must be steeped in one doctrine,
leading to the adoption of implementation throughout the HN element.
Because the MMP may be conducted over an extensive geographical area,
mentors will enjoy significant independence, increasing the opportunities
12

See for example, Flynn, et al. “Fixing Intel:” op cit.
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for their unregulated deviation. Enforced adherence to the central doctrine
is a key brake on doctrinal drift, in which focus shifts to a different,
sometimes less important, area or tangent.
The doctrine also provides mentors and HN operators alike with
intelligence practices consistent with the rule of law. This is important.
Although the mentors—at least initially—would be drawn from liberal
democracies, they often would be applying the doctrine in regions with
little cultural experience in rule of law and many temptations and
incentives to circumvent rule-of-law practices. Hence the doctrine would
be designed to anchor mentors and HN practitioners alike in rule-of-law
principles.
To prepare the country-specific doctrine, the MMP would employ
a range of specialists and practitioners who would be tasked with
providing a working doctrine and plan capable of being implemented in a
specific conflict environment. The resultant work would describe and
explain methodology at the local, regional, and national levels of
operation, as well as specific functions, such as the desk system. Other
issues, such as procedures for interacting with other security forces, would
also be addressed. Finally, the doctrine would provide mentors with
phased “goalposts”—measures of effectiveness that are expected to be met
at particular stages of MMP implementation.
To ensure its applicability in the field, there should be a specified
“doctrine group,” which should include, at an appropriate time, senior
members of the HN service. The receipt and incorporation of HN
comment within the MMP doctrine process will serve as a significant
facilitator for future operational cooperation. Done thoughtfully and
honestly, the MMP doctrine quickly becomes “their” doctrine, influenced
by foreign and historical experience but authorized by HN practitioners.
Additionally, a diverse set of individuals or country experts with
experience in the HN culture and others who possess insights into HN
dynamics should be called upon for comment. These independent experts,
while not necessarily well versed in local intelligence or security practices,
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often pose important questions that were ignored during intelligence
practitioner discussions of the model and doctrine.
The centrality of doctrine should not infer rigidity. As commanders
often discover, their plans and strategies—no matter how intricately
planned—are often short-lived once battle begins. No amount of
preparation or engagement can ward off problems in application.
Therefore, the doctrine is offered as a fluid document, promoting the key
qualities of the model in forceful terms but also providing for future edits
and revisions as necessitated by events on the ground.
Mentor Personnel
As noted, doctrine plays a key—if not a decisive—role in
determining the success or failure of the MMP. This emphasis is
somewhat unorthodox. Conventional training programs often suborn
doctrinal consideration in favor of simply recruiting those with supposedly
attractive skill sets and backgrounds: police can train police, military can
train military. This reversal of emphasis does not indicate that the caliber
of affiliated personnel should be relegated to an afterthought. The
application of the model within the HN context relies heavily on the
quality of those assigned to convey it, particularly in the initial stages of
the process.
But what specific skills should mentors possess? Optimally, their
skills sets and experience would match the level of HN operators they
were assigned to mentor: managers’ work at national and regional nodes,
operators’ work at the local level. Individuals assigned to these roles
should possess at least several years’ experience in the conduct of
intelligence operations at varying levels of responsibility (local, regional,
and national). The term “intelligence operations” should suggest a very
broad range of required skill sets, from individuals skilled as collectors to
analysts to those with experience managing intelligence professionals.
Just as important as previous experience, however, is the mentor’s
ability to convey these experiences and the lessons learned to foreign
professionals. This requirement renders personnel with successful prior
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mentoring experience particularly valuable. A certain comfort level
working in foreign environments and the ability to adapt to foreign
cultural traits is highly desirable as well. Additionally, MMP personnel
will need to be able to easily communicate with their HN counterparts,
requiring in some countries the recruitment of especially skilled
interpreters who are willing and prepared to serve in this special capacity
for months at a time.
There are advantages to mentors whose military intelligence
backgrounds—i.e., their orientation and experience—would help facilitate
the integration of MMP capacity within the overall military construct.
However, this scenario presupposes a surplus of government personnel
with experience in intelligence, cultural interaction, and some types of
police work, a dim prospect given contemporary budgets and the demands
of ongoing conflicts. This is not a major impediment, however, as
contractors or U.S. government civilians are available who possess
extensive backgrounds in intelligence or unique forms of police work. If
properly trained in the doctrine, they could successfully build the capacity
within HN services under the supervision of the U.S. military.
Whatever their backgrounds, the MMP, if sponsored by the
military, should always be supervised and managed by a U.S. officer of
sufficient rank or stature to successfully represent the program before the
U.S. command staff. This figure would serve to ensure that the MMP
gains broad acceptance throughout the force, and could reserve
operational, logistical, or intelligence support were it required. He or she
could also serve as the military “face” of the program, solving disputes
with the HN on behalf of both the U.S. military and the MMP.
Possessing this uniformed interlocutor in a conflict environment is
critical. One can easily envision a scenario in which mentor personnel
require security or vehicles to help mentor HN officers through a sensitive
operation. Rather than a civilian or contractor attempting to secure these
resources from local commanders—a problematic request for many
different reasons—the MMP’s military supervisor can easily interface
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with fellow command staffers to reserve the required material support in a
coordinated and healthy manner.
Mentoring
Intermittent interface and casual conversation is not sufficient for
transferring the sophisticated tenets of the model, particularly as
operations against hostile forces begin. In order to fully realize the benefits
of the program, the MMP (and their interpreters) must enjoy near constant
access to their partner trainees—living, eating, and working alongside
them, often in forward operating bases or police stations. Although
mentors should not participate in HN operations, they should be in a
position to observe them through daily planning and debriefings. This
proximity allows the mentors to oversee the minutiae of intelligence and
security work and offer pertinent, real-time advisory support rather than
just theory and generalizations. It also fosters a regular and increasingly
comfortable working relationship between HN and MMP personnel,
facilitating trust and confidence in other aspects of the model. A paternal
but collegial relationship can be expected to develop between HN and
MMP personnel.
It is important that these mentoring efforts be executed
simultaneously at all three levels of model operations: local, regional, and
national. Mentors assigned to these different elements should be able to
converse in the details of the doctrine of their respective elements while
also maintaining awareness of the doctrine at other levels of the HN
structure. Narrow or exclusive partnership at one level of operations will
lead to incongruence and a general operational disconnect that can impede
force growth for years. Comprehensive engagement of the mentors of the
entire model grants MMP and the U.S. military the ability to make
structurewide alterations in a relatively expedient and consistent manner.
Even with persistent field mentoring, it is essential to hold regular
formal training events in which HN officers are removed from the field for
a period of intense instruction. These events ideally would take place soon
after the MMP is initiated in order to educate HN trainees as to the scope,
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concept, and intention of the program, as well as the degree of HN and
U.S. institutional support the model enjoys. These sessions will become
even more effective when mentors attend the sessions along with their
trainees, allowing a seamless transition from classroom to the field. Just as
field mentoring operations are perpetually guided by doctrine, the training
curriculum should be formulated and approved beforehand.
As the raison d’être of the overall program, mentoring operations
should be afforded their own supervisor. That person could be a mentor or
former practitioner. While the U.S. military commander will service the
day-to-day demands of the program, the MMP should ideally feature an
additional general auditor, supervisor, or compliance officer who will
track the success or failure of mentoring efforts throughout the program’s
area of responsibility, in close consultation with military officials. This
position would provide U.S. military officers and MMP personnel an
“over-watch” capability, allowing them to quickly diagnose and remedy
failures as well as to identify successes that can be applied elsewhere.
Command Support and Integration
No matter how well-structured the MMP’s doctrine and mentoring
system is or how talented its personnel are, a successful mentoring
initiative of this scale requires the full support of co-located U.S. and HN
military units. To ensure the health of this relationship, the MMP must
enjoy broad awareness and support among military commanders and their
staffs; sidelining the intelligence function as an ancillary effort initiated
and maintained by one component can be damaging to both the MMP and
the overall military enterprise. This mutual support is key as HN security
service and affiliated trainers will often require logistical and security
support from conventional military units, particularly in the beginning. To
ensure that such requests are not viewed as disruptive or “extra work,” it is
important that the military commanders regularly impress the importance
of the MMP upon their subordinate commanders.
To engineer and secure the necessary level of institutional support,
MMP personnel should be proactive in both promoting the MMP concept
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and regularly updating military commanders as to ongoing developments.
Training materials, doctrine, and program updates should be regularly
briefed to U.S. commanders to ensure a high level of transparency and
familiarity. MMP leadership should endeavor to build an accessible
electronic clearinghouse for programmatic documents. The MMP should
also seek to facilitate connections between U.S. commanders and skilled
HN personnel, an effort that would quickly impress upon senior military
officials the benefits of continued mentoring.
Broadening the scope of this integration effort, the MMP should
also seek out additional partners within the U.S. military presence,
interacting and cooperating with the many operational and support
components. Enjoying a close relationship with highly trained indigenous
security officials, the MMP will have much to offer U.S. military units in
terms of information; indeed, the work of integrating the MMP within the
overall military structure is not a matter of justifying the value of such
measures but of publicizing the benefits to the widest audience of U.S.
military and security personnel. This effort should include the facilitation
of meetings between U.S. officers and officials and their HN counterparts,
meetings that the MMP will stand uniquely capable of arranging due to
their working relationship with the HN intelligence service. All such
actions should work towards a goal of establishing a close working
relationship between the U.S. and the HN security service that is viewed
as mutually beneficial by all involved.
One key method by which the U.S. military can bolster the HN
force is by selectively sharing information with them, such as data
concerning the existence and identities of infiltrators working against the
HN security apparatus. A U.S. unit specifically tasked with vetting or covetting HN personnel can improve the internal security function of the HN
unit. This also serves to protect MMP mentors from hostile or
untrustworthy personnel and helps to address problems of local nepotism
and cronyism. This U.S. element could initially be responsible for
identifying counterintelligence threats facing the local HN service,
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working through the MMP and other affiliated U.S. units to make best use
of the information.
This outreach activity is in many ways a programmatic imperative;
it is likely that the MMP would be executed concurrently with several
other initiatives aimed at enhancing conventional military or police
capabilities. Without some measure of coordination, these programs can
rapidly become competitive, diminishing the overall HN capacity-building
effort. Thus, the MMP military coordinator should seek to ensure that the
closest possible working relationship be established between MMP and
other training programs, optimally within the military’s dedicated HN
training component. Similar training is occurring, for example, with
Afghanistan local and national police and the Afghan National Army,
where the U.S. is involved in training units at all levels (national, district,
provincial, village) to be able to complete their specific tasks.
Another factor that compels integration is the value of informationsharing agreements. As their capabilities are reinforced through regular
instruction and mentoring, it is probable that HN intelligence/police
personnel would increasingly gain access to information of importance to
the U.S. military. Although the mentoring program is exclusively tasked
with building indigenous capability—not serving as “spies” on behalf of
the U.S. military—it should not shy away from facilitating intelligencesharing relationships between U.S. forces and the HN service at the local,
regional, and national levels of operations. MMP personnel would stand
ready to help broker, guide, and reinforce efforts designed to secure this
relationship between the HN force and the U.S. military.
Developing Indigenous Support
Imposing an externally sourced method of operations within the
HN is rife with opportunities for miscommunication and error. No matter
how quality HN personnel are intricately incorporated in the formulation
and execution process, the model will usually be viewed as a foreign idea,
at least in the short term. Managed abruptly and unilaterally, the MMP
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could lead to a degradation of existing HN capability as well as a general
deterioration of the HN relationship with U.S. forces.
Joint formulation and reformulation of doctrine and planning
provides an excellent venue for cooperation; however, it is only one of
many options. The MMP and its U.S. military advisers must be energetic
in engaging with officials at all levels of HN security administration,
seeking their formal support as well as the support of their respective
agencies. This process should occur as early as possible before program
initiation and should continue continually throughout. The signings of
joint memorandums and statements of understanding should be
emphasized, as formal paper trails may prove important in supporting the
MMP over the long term. This campaign of engagement should be
conducted with the full cooperation of the American interagency group in
the country, allowing for a broader range of indigenous contacts who
could be called upon to lend support to the MMP throughout the HN
government. Within the HN service, engagement should proceed at all
levels of operations while respecting command and control structures.
This comprehensive engagement is critical. The opinions and findings of
officers at the national level may be radically different from HN
representatives operating at lower levels of authority. It is key to
understand these different viewpoints during doctrine formulation, rather
than have them arise unexpectedly during implementation.

B. Exporting the Capability Without U.S. Military
Presence
The second major environment where local dominance can be
effective with partner states is regions in which there are few if any U.S.
military forces deployed but where the outcome of local struggles is
important to U.S. interests. These areas are likely to be relatively new or
transitional democracies or adjacent to regions deemed vital to the United
States, such as Central America and the circum-Caribbean. They will
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usually have limited economic resources and infrastructures and little
experience with rule-of-law-oriented policing and intelligence.
After identifying a priority fragile state in which the United States
seeks to bolster the local intelligence capability, the U.S. first needs to
persuade the Host Nation that, with U.S. assistance, the HN can enhance
its local intelligence in a manner consistent with rule-of-law principles.
This will take considerable sensitivity and skill by U.S. diplomats,
soldiers, and others. It will require securing the support of the senior HN
leadership. Their agreement is essential as to which of their specific
services will be trained to be the lead agency to manage and carry out this
function.
Developing indigenous capacity to achieve intelligence dominance
consistent with rule-of-law principles in these areas will require many of
the same capabilities that are required in areas where U.S. military forces
are the “badge and gun.” It will, however, require U.S. officials to use
military and civilian diplomatic and entrepreneurial skills in sovereign
countries that do not seek any U.S. conventional military presence. The
U.S. will work with the selected services and adapt the dominance
doctrine, prepare an operational plan, select the sites, and prepare U.S. and
foreign contractors to mentor locals over a period of one to three years.
This will ensure that the HN is empowered to obtain the local intelligence
that it needs and that the U.S. wants to receive.
To begin with, there is a need for U.S. professionals familiar with
the model. This unit would have the authority and budget to assist selected
foreign democracies or subregions that conclude that their current
capabilities do not provide them with the requisite local knowledge to
fulfill their security requirements and that they are interested in developing
their own local intelligence. Assuming that there are ten or more countries
or parts of countries that may seek such capabilities in the future, a
permanent U.S. team of professionals would be required—commanders,
country managers, mentor leaders, trainers, analysts, evaluators, and IT
specialists. Such a unit would be required for at least five to ten years, as it
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would take a minimum of three to five years in any given country or
region to develop and institutionalize the dominance capacity.
The permanent U.S. team would also need to hire contractors as
mentors, interpreters, IT specialists, and so forth. While the permanent
unit would almost certainly need to be cleared U.S. personnel, the mentors
could be vetted U.S. citizens or foreigners.
The U.S. unit, operating under U.S. interagency direction and
oversight, would first have to identify appropriate host country units with
which to partner. The likely choices would be the HN security service,
police, army, or some combination of HN agencies. It might be a sub-state
unit in a province of the country. There are advantages and disadvantages
to dominance capacity building in each of these bureaucracies. In general,
police forces have the most access to the local street, as well as a direct
connection to the judicial system; the domestic security service often has
competence in clandestine tradecraft and is connected to their own and
other foreign services; the military has a high degree of competence in
various skill sets.
However, one size does not fit all contingencies. Among the most
important variables in selecting partner agencies to be considered are the
following:
1.
The HN’s services leadership perspective and
preferences—are they going to be supportive and provide human
and material resources for the project?
2.
The competence and integrity of the leadership of particular
HN agencies—do they have competent and honest professional
managers and staff?
3.
The particular irregular warfare challenges in the country,
such as the particular terrain where the armed groups are operating
or the transnational operations of the groups, and how local
dominance can be effective in the region.
It is important for the U.S. to conduct its own assessment of the
particular challenges in the Host Nation. The next step would be to
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transform the model of dominance presented above to a draft concept of
operations (CONOPS)—principles, phased operational plan, budget,
timeline, milestone—for this specific HN. The CONOPS should be
developed in cooperation with the HN, which must to be on board. Then
an MOU/MOA can be negotiated.
The U.S. and the HN would jointly adapt the doctrine. As
appropriate, they would together prepare logistical equipment and
arrangements, vet the personnel teams for local units, and develop regional
and national TCGs (or their equivalents). They would also brief other
elements of the HN security establishment whose assistance is required
(e.g., the military, prison service, border police) to ensure HN that
resources would be forthcoming. After that, they would begin the selection
of specific regional and local boundaries for the units and select and
prepare the mentor teams.
Preparing the country assessment and CONOPS and negotiating an
MOA could very well take six months. Another six months could be
required for the subsequent marshaling and vetting of personnel,
adaptation of the doctrine and logistical arrangements, and training of HN
personnel before the system becomes operational. Six months later, the
system could be expected to produce significant, measurable intelligence.
It will be essential to do this in a number of countries and regions.
To accomplish this, intelligence dominance needs to be embedded in at
least one of the U.S. foreign assistance programs. This will require
authorities and budget.
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